Security of countermeasures against state-of-the-art differential scan attacks by Ege, B. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/119968
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Security of Countermeasures Against
State-of-the-Art Differential Scan Attacks
Baris¸ Ege∗, Amitabh Das†, Lejla Batina∗, Ingrid Verbauwhede†
∗ ICIS / Digital Security Group
Radboud University Nijmegen
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
email: B.Ege@cs.ru.nl, lejla@cs.ru.nl
† KU Leuven, ESAT/COSIC and iMinds
Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium
email: firstname.lastname@esat.kuleuven.be
Abstract—Test compression schemes have been claimed to
provide a certain level of security against scan-based side-channel
attacks. To mitigate these attacks, a number of scan attack
countermeasures are proposed in the literature. Recently, a new
differential scan attack (DSA) is proposed which focuses on the
S-box outputs rather than the S-box inputs as in previous attacks.
In this paper, a systematic security analysis of the most popular
scan attack countermeasures against this differential scan attack
is given. The countermeasures are evaluated when they are used
together with industrial test compression schemes on a straight-
forward AES design. Security of the countermeasures is evaluated
by emulating their behaviour in software, and the gain in security
is experimentally investigated. Our experiments show that when
the new DSA (focusing on the S-box output) is considered, both
scan chain scrambling and partial scan countermeasures fail to
provide sufficient security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Design-for-test (DFT) is the test infrastructure added to a
circuit to improve the controllability and observability of the
internal flip-flops and nodes. It is employed in the efficient
generation and application of manufacturing tests to complex
circuits. Scan chains are the most efficient DFT structures used
widely in the semiconductor industry nowadays. A test mode
is added to the circuit in a way that when the circuit is in
this mode, all flip-flops are connected in one or more shift
registers. The inputs and outputs of these shift registers (also
known as scan registers) are made into primary inputs and
primary outputs [1].
Test compression is widely deployed in the semiconductor
industry for testing complex circuits in a short time and lower
costs without compromising test quality. When test vectors are
generated for a circuit by an automatic test pattern generator
(ATPG), most of the bit positions are unspecified, or don’t care
(X) states, which are randomly filled with 0s or 1s, to enable
its use on an Automatic Test Equipment (ATE). These X-
states can ruin the test output if not handled with care. Testing
industry has two main solutions to this problem: X-masking
and X-tolerant logic.
Scan chains may be permanently disabled after testing of
the chip (by blowing some fuses, for instance) before being
used in a product, but then the in-field testability of the chip
is lost. In some applications, such as set-top box decoders, the
firmware updates happens in most cases through the JTAG port
internally connected to the scan chains. Hence, scan chains
must be left intact.
Cryptographic circuits need a special testing strategy due
to the constraints on security. Though scan-chain Design-for-
Test (DFT) offers the highest testability, it is prone to scan-
based side channel leakages which may enable a non-invasive
attack on secure chips to extract secret information. There
are scan-based attacks on symmetric-key algorithms through
the test interface published in the literature [2]. In 2012,
two attacks([3], [4]) on X-masking and X-tolerant logic are
published pursuing two different methods. While Ege et al.[3]
takes a more traditional approach and work on differences
given to the plaintext, Da Rolt et al.[4] proposes to look for
differences after the S-box layer in AES therefore making it
possible to attack even when as little as one bit of information
is leaked to the scan outputs.
There are a number of scan attack countermeasures pro-
posed in the literature. One of the approaches is based on
randomizing the scan sequence. A pseudo-random selection
of scan chains is made and loaded with scan data at a time.
Instead of serially transmitting the bit stream through the
scan registers, the process is randomized. This scheme is
also known as scan chain scrambling [5]. The ‘Flipped Scan
Tree’ architecture [6] introduces inverters at the scan-in inputs
of some of the scan flip-flops. The location of the flipped
scan flip-flops in the scan tree architecture is known only to
the designer and the SoC Tester, and completely unknown
to an attacker. Embedded Deterministic Test (EDT) used in
the popular MentorGraphics test compression tool, Tessent
TestKompress, compresses the scan chains and imposes a
dynamic mask on the scan outputs, and has been claimed to be
secure against scan based attacks[7]. Other countermeasures
include the ‘Lock and Key Technique’ [8], the design for
secure test [9] employing an ad-hoc approach for pipelined
AES, and the technique involving reset of the security chip and
removing all traces of any secret information or cryptographic
algorithm execution in test mode [5].
In this paper, we analyze the security of the most popular
scan attack countermeasures when they are combined with
the industrial test compression schemes. We implement the
attack proposed in [4] to evaluate the security provided by
each scheme and provide results for each combination of
“countermeasure”-“compression scheme” couples.
Structure of the paper is as follows. Previous work on scan
attacks is summarized in Section II. The basic scan attack
strategy is explained in Section III. The attack as applied
to industrial test compression schemes, specifically Adaptive
Scan from Synopsys, OPMISR from Cadence, and EDT from
Mentor Graphics is also presented in the same Section. The
main part of this paper is Section IV where we present the
differential scan attack on industrial test compression schemes
combined with three popular scan attack countermeasures,
specifically scan chain scrambling, partial scan and Lock and
Key Technique. Discussion on the applicability of other scan
attack countermeasures is also included. A summary of the
effectiveness of combined test compression and scan attack
countermeasures is also given in that Section. We conclude
the paper with ideas for future work in Section V.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
The first attempt of analysing the security of scan testable
circuits is presented by Yang et al. in 2006 [2]. The attack
exploits the possibility of scanning out the contents of the
round register after execution of one round of encryption
or decryption. Later in 2007, Liu and Huang published an
analysis [10], which also considers the response compactor of
a test compression scheme. In that work, the authors focus
on the Embedded Deterministic Test by Mentor Graphics, and
evaluate the security of the scheme by identifying the flip-flops
(FFs) which can be used for inferring the encryption key. The
authors refer to these registers as key registers, and similarly
the term key dependent Flip-Flops (KFFs) is used for those
registers in the rest of this work. In that work, the authors
claim that identification of these KFFs in the scan design is
crucial for successful recovery of the encryption key. However,
this has been proved wrong in later works by Da Rolt et al.
[11], [12].
In [12], Da Rolt et al. present a scan based attack on
an AES design with a scan response compactor, in which
the identification of KFFs is not necessary for mounting a
successful attack. They show that the attack proposed in [2] is
directly applicable to designs which use an XOR tree structure
for scan response compaction. They also provide different
attack strategies for different distributions of KFFs over the
scan chains. However, the scan-attack assumes a simple XOR
compactor structure, without considering X-masking or X-
tolerant architectures which can affect the success of the
attack.
In [3], the attack proposed in [13] and improved in [12]
are further extended to work against testing circuits with
X-masking and X-tolerant logic (as they are used in most
test compression schemes in the industry). Later in [4], a
new method is proposed to perform DSA on AES circuits
exploiting the linear structure of the MixColumns operation
in AES. Here, the authors proposed to look for 1 bit differences
after the SubBytes operation rather than providing two
plaintexts with a certain Hamming difference in between.
This attack is shown as effective against X-Masking schemes,
Partial Scan and MISR based time compaction. Although
theoretical analysis is given for the attack success in that paper,
no experimental evidence is provided until now.
III. BACKGROUND
In this work, scan attacks are demonstrated on AES as it
is a widely used standardized block cipher and it also enables
the reader to compare the work with previous works available
in the literature. Since AES is a well-known block cipher we
leave out the explanation of the details of it, and we refer the
interested reader to [14].
A. Differential Scan Attacks on AES
This attack[2] basically exploits the fact that two particular
inputs to the round function of AES can transform into output
vectors with a unique Hamming distance in between after one
round of encryption. For instance, if two plaintexts with an
XOR difference of 0x01 in their least significant byte (LSB),
are encrypted using only one round of AES, the Hamming
distance between the one round output vectors can only have
a handful of values. A one byte difference in the plaintext
will transform into a four byte difference due to the structure
of the MixColumn operation. Analysing the distribution of
the Hamming distances for all 27 pairs generated with the
byte difference 0x01 in their LSB, one can easily verify
that there are four Hamming distance values (9, 12, 23 and
24) which can only be generated by a unique pair of inputs.
Therefore, whenever such a Hamming distance is observed
between the output vectors, one can XOR the corresponding
plaintext byte with the pre-computed value to recover a byte
of the encryption key.
Another approach to perform differential scan attack is to
focus on the S-box outputs [4]. Rather than encrypting two
plaintexts with a certain byte difference in between, one can
also generate plaintext pairs which give a certain difference
after the SubBytes operation, for a given(or guessed) key. If
a fixed difference can be achieved after the S-box, the linear
structure of the MixColumns operation will distribute the
difference over the state always the same way. In other words,
XOR of the first round outputs corresponding to the given
plaintext pair is always a fixed value if the key guess is correct.
Therefore, as long as the same test parameters can be set,
XOR difference of the test outputs should be exactly the same,
leading to much more powerful attacks than the earlier efforts.
These attacks are both based on evaluating the Hamming
distances between the pairs of outputs after one round AES for
different number of input pairs of plaintexts. Figure 1 shows
the distribution of KFFs in the scan chains of a hardware
design. As illustrated in the figure, a column of scan flip-
flops containing one corresponding flip-flop for each scan-
chain represents a slice. The flip-flops denoted by Fij are
ordinary scan flip-flops, whereas the flip-flops containing a
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Fig. 1. Slices and active slices.
key bit is denoted by Kij , where i stands for the scan-chain
number and j indicates the position of the respective flip-flop
in the scan-chain. Any slice containing one or more KFFs is
called an active slice, while the others are called non-active
slices. For instance in the figure, the slice containing KFFs
K11 and K31 represents an active slice.
B. Industrial Test Compression Schemes
Different EDA vendors use different strategies for test
compression but the most vendors including Mentor Graphics,
Cadence and Synopsys, agree on using either X-tolerant logic
or X-masking to deal with X-states in scan chains. Details of
different industrial test compression schemes can be found in
[1]. This is particularly important when analyzing the security
of these systems when they are used in crypto chips since
these systems affect the attack approach and eventually the
success rate of the attack.
X-tolerant logic generally has multiple test outputs to ensure
that there is always at least one test output which is not
corrupted by X-states. These test outputs are basically the
XOR of a collection of scan chain outputs and usually the
same scan chain output is used in generating multiple test
outputs.
Different from X-tolerant logic, X-masking is implemented
with the aid of a mask register and AND gates at each scan
chain output (see Fig. 1). The value in the mask register
determines which scan chains are going to be included in the
test output and this value can also be updated with a certain
frequency. If the mask register is not updated during test (as
in Cadence OPMISR) we refer to it as static X-masking. If
the mask register is updated during test, then we refer to the
system as dynamic X-masking (as in Mentor Graphics EDT).
IV. COMBINED SCAN ATTACK ON AES WITH TEST
COMPRESSION AND SCAN ATTACK COUNTERMEASURES IN
PLACE
As almost all complex circuits contain some degree of
test compression nowadays, it is worthwhile to evaluate their
interaction with scan attack countermeasures. In this section,
we investigate the effectiveness of scan attack countermeasures
when they are used together with the leading test compres-
sion schemes. For this, we simulated the behaviour of the
compaction algorithms of the test compression schemes, and
also the effect of countermeasures are emulated in software.
This approach enables us to get a reliable evaluation on the
effectiveness of the countermeasures in reasonable time. The
details of countermeasures and the evaluation in terms of
security and cost are included in the following sub-sections.
The DSA technique([4]) used in this paper is applied on the
respective software emulation of these structures.
A. Partial Scan
We first consider the countermeasure proposed by Inoue et
al. in ETS’09. This scheme (named as balanced secure scan)
aims to protect non-scan registers by employing a test con-
troller that enables the test mode only when an authentication
succeeds [15]. Only a few flip-flops belonging to the secret
registers are included in the scan chains. Further confusion is
added to the kernel wherever a secret register is inserted in
the scan chain. The partial scan methodology is represented
graphically in Figure 2.
 
Fig. 2. Partial Scan [15].
The outline of the proposed method is as follows. First, scan
registers are selected so that the kernel becomes a balanced
structure and the number of FFs in secret registers selected as
scan registers is minimized. Then, if some secret registers are
selected as scan registers, confusion circuits are added into the
kernel to randomise the values of the secret registers in test
mode while preserving balanced structure.
As shown in the figure, ‘test1’ and ‘test2’ control the
functioning of the test controller which in turn decides which
mode the circuit will be. If either ‘test1’ or ‘test2’ is high, the
circuit is in test mode; if both are low, the circuit is in normal
functional mode. In test mode, the shift operation of the scan
chain is enabled. Moreover during test mode, a dynamically
changing mask is XORed to the key-dependent secret FFs to
add confusion to them. Here ‘confused signals’ actually mean
the secret crypto FFs which needs to be protected from an
attacker. Once the circuit is in normal mode, it cannot be
shifted to test mode. This is due to the FFs which maintain
their states and their outputs are ANDed with ‘test1’ and
‘test2’.
Using this method, 100% fault efficiency is demonstrated to
be achieved for all the cases considered in [15] (Partial Scan
DFT structures implemented on open-source RSA decryption
core, 100%, 50% and 25% confusion added) with reasonable
test generation time (for instance, 72.66 sec for the case
50% confusion, instead of 30.47 sec for full scan). However,
the method identifies more redundant faults than full scan.
The area overhead for incorporating this scheme is restricted
between 6% and 9% depending on the amount of confusion
circuits added.
To emulate the effect of this countermeasure in our software
implementation of the attack, a random selection of KFFs,
according to the chosen parameter, are excluded from the scan
design. Results are given for 75%, 50%, 25% masking and
with only one unmasked KFF.
The new differential scan attack presented in [4] is quite
effective against partial scan combined with X-Masking and
X-tolerant logic as indicated by the high success rates in Table
I.
The attack is applied following the exact same methodology
proposed in [4]. First, a suitable test input value which leaks
information about KFFs is searched. Then, the actual attack
is performed by making a key guess, and forming the input
set. Later, the input set is processed through the testing circuit
in pairs and the resulting test outputs are XORed together. If
the output XORs of all pairs from the input set are the same,
then the key byte is regarded as the most probable key byte.
Whenever the guessed key matches with the actual key of the
system, we regard the attack as successful.
The results given in Table I show the ratio of successful
attacks over all 10 000 experiments. Repeating the attack
10 000 times took less than 24 seconds in all cases, with the
set-up we have used to run simulations.
B. Scan Chain Scrambling
In this approach, the order of the scan chain elements is
altered by a scrambler [5]. When the scan mode has been
reached securely, the scan chain elements are ordered in a
predetermined manner. However, in insecure mode, the order
of the scan chains elements keeps changing at a certain
frequency. Each scan chain is divided into multiple scan
elements and the order of connections of the scan elements is
controlled through the scan chain scrambler. The scan chain
scrambling methodology is represented graphically in Figure
3.
	



	
 

 


	
 
 
Fig. 3. Scan Chain Scrambling.
The extra area requirement of this scheme is quite small.
Though test time can reduce using this method due to reduced
size of scan chain segments, routing of the complete design
can become more difficult due to modifications in the standard
scan path.
This countermeasure can be emulated by changing the order
in which the scan chains are connected using a pseudo-
random generator at a frequency which is a fraction of that
of the scan frequency. However, simulating the behavior of
scan chain scrambling countermeasure is a bit challenging
as there are no clear explanations in the paper as to how
it should be implemented. Therefore, we chose to simulate
the effect of this countermeasure by starting from a KFF
distribution with 32 active scan chains and 32 active slices, and
randomly re-ordering rows and columns of this distribution.
In the end, we get a KFF distribution with different number
of active slices and active scan chains. For this work, we
generated 1000 random distributions to analyse the effect of
this countermeasure.
Table I shows that scan chain scrambling method is trans-
parent to the attack outlined in this work. This is because the
structure of the scan chain scrambling is assumed to depend
on the test inputs. Therefore, as long as the same test input is
used for all the elements of the input set, the attack is expected
to be successful.
Repeating the attack 1000 times took less than 19 seconds
in all cases, with the set-up we have used to run simulations.
C. Lock and Key Technique
The Lock and Key technique [8] is intended at preventing
malicious attackers from revealing secret information stored
in the chip. The scan chains are divided into smaller sub-
chains of equal length and a random selection of the sub-
chain is made when an unauthorized user attempts to access
the scan chains by switching to the insecure test mode. Thus,
malicious users cannot predict where in the scan chain the
stimuli on the scan inputs (SIs) goes and where the response
from the scan outputs (SOs) comes from. Test vectors are not
sequentially shifted into each sub-chain but instead a LFSR
selects a random sub-chain to be filled. The general structure
is represented in Figure 4.
LFSR
FSM
Decoder
Test Key Comparator
Subchain 1
Subchain 2
Subchain 3
Subchain m
SO
log2 m
SI
TC
CLK
SI
m bits wide
ENm
EN3
EN2EN1
Test Security Controller (TSC)
Fig. 4. Architecture of the Lock and key technique.
TABLE I
SUCCESS RATES FOR THE ATTACK[4] ON TEST COMPRESSION SCHEMES WITH COUNTERMEASURES
Partial Scan - 75% Partial Scan - 50% Partial Scan - 25% Scrambling
X-tolerant logic 100% 100% 100% 100%
Static X-masking 100% 100% 99.63% 100%
Dynamic X-masking 100% 100% 99.59% 100%
When the circuit under test (CUT) is initially reset, a Finite
State Machine (FSM) sets the Test Security Controller (TSC)
into insecure mode and will remain in this insecure state until
TC is enabled. It is only after TC has been enabled for the first
time and a test key has been entered that the TSC may exit the
insecure state. When a test key is entered and a user has been
ensured to be a trusted user, the FSM allows the TSC to enter
secure mode allowing predictable operation of the scan chains
and will remain in this state until the CUT is reset. Otherwise,
the TSC will remain in insecure mode and the behaviour of
the scan chain will not longer be predictable. If the entered
key fails, the TSC remains in insecure mode and will seed
the LFSR with an unpredictable random seed, essentially
locking the scan chains from being used correctly. Since the
choice of sub-chain is pseudo-random due to the LFSR, it is
difficult to predict the response on SO if both the seed and the
configuration of the LFSR are unknown. In insecure mode,
the scan configuration keeps changing with each test clock
and is unpredictable. The predictable behaviour of the LFSR
primitive polynomial is removed when functioning in insecure
mode for sufficiently long time. This is done by changing the
LFSR configuration in insecure mode by using some additional
bits (active only in insecure mode through multiplexers) which
changes the feedback to the LFSR. Moreover, the FSM can be
configured to generate a new random LFSR seed every round
to further make scan attacks difficult.
Here, it should be noted that, in insecure mode, no two test
inputs are processed in the same way, and thereby destroying
any chance of mounting a successful differential attack.
D. Other Countermeasures
There are also other scan attack countermeasures such as
insertion of inverters [6], Design for Secure Test [9], Resetting
crypto chip in test mode [5], and masking schemes [12] that
were not evaluated experimentally in this work. These schemes
are briefly discussed qualitatively in this sub-section for the
sake of completeness.
The insertion of inverters [6] is completely transparent to
differential scan attacks, even though the locations of the secret
inverters in the scan chains are kept secret. The reason behind
this is that the position of the inverters is kept fixed in the scan
path, and when the XOR difference of the scan data from two
scan outputs is taken (as is done in differential scan attacks),
their effect is neutralised.
The Design for Secure Test [9] which checks the parity
of consecutive AES rounds is an ad-hoc solution for AES
designs with a completely unrolled structure (having high
area requirements), limiting its applicability to other designs.
Though the scheme involving resetting the crypto chip and
removing all traces of cryptographic execution in test mode
[5] provides a high level of security. The scan attack employed
in this paper is not effective against these schemes as all there
is no secret stored in the round register. However, this scheme
has the limitation that it is not applicable for implementations
where there is a requirement to store some kind of secret data
on-chip.
The Masking schemes proposed in [12] which mask each
bit of the round register are effective against scan attacks.
Therefore, the scan attack employed in this paper does not
work against these schemes as all the round register flip flops
are masked. However, these schemes have somewhat higher
area overhead.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we give the first comparative study of the two
most popular scan attack countermeasures when they are used
together with popular test compression strategies: XOR space
compaction with X-masking and X-tolerant logic. Results
suggest that the new differential scan attack which focuses
on the S-box outputs is effective against all test compression
schemes.
Since no particular information about the X-tolerant com-
pactor is exploited in this work, a possible future work can be
to study the design of the compactor and see if it is possible
to increase the success rates by exploiting its structure. This is
very important to investigate as it makes it possible to reverse
engineer the structure of the compactor.
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